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ABSTRACT Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems represent a key technology for ubiquitous
computing and for the deployment of the Internet of Things (IoT). In RFID technology, authentication pro-
tocols are often necessary in order to confirm the identity of the parties involved (i.e. RFID readers, RFID tags
and/or database servers). In this article, we analyze the security of a mutual authentication protocol proposed
byWang andMa. Our security analysis clearly showsmajor security pitfalls in this protocol. Firstly, we show
two approaches that an adversary may use to mislead an honest reader into thinking that it is communicating
with a legitimate database. Secondly, we show how an adversary that has compromised some tags can
impersonate an RFID reader to a legitimate database. Furthermore, we present a new adversary model, which
pays heed on cases missed by previous proposals. In contrast to previous models where the communication
between an RFID reader and a back-end server is through a secure channel, our model facilitates the security
analysis of more general schemes where this communication channel (RFID reader-to-server) is insecure.
This model determines whether the compromise of RFID tags has any impact on the security of the reader-
to-server communication or vice versa. In a secure protocol, the possible compromise of RFID tags should
not affect the RFID reader-server communication. In this paper, we show that compromising of RFID tags
in Wang and Ma protocol has a direct impact on the reader-server security. Finally, we propose a new
authentication protocol that offers an adequate security level and is resistant against the mentioned security
risks. The security proofs of the proposed protocol are supported with Gong-Needham-Yahalom (GNY)
logic and Scyther tool, which are formal methods to evaluate the security of a cryptographic protocol.
INDEX TERMS Adversary model, IoT, RFID, authentication, security analysis, scyther tool, GNY logic.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) envisions applications where
multiple objects interact and cooperate, provide different
services and are accessible at any time from many points
[1], [2]. More precisely, given many available features
such as social networks, software defined optical networks
(SDONs), fifth generation (5G) cellular networks, Internet
of Vehicles (IoV), Internet of Energy (IoE), Internet of
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Wen Chen .
Sensors (IoS), Machine to Machine Communications
(M2M), artificial intelligence and machine and deep learning
this vision will advance more, although it will also cope with
new challenges as well [3]. Among those features, 5G cellular
networks provide key enabling technologies for ubiquitous
deployment of the IoT technology, that are include multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO), massive-MIMO (M-MIMO),
coordinated multipoint processing (CoMP), device-to-device
(D2D) communications, centralized radio access network
(CRAN), software-defined wireless sensor networking (SD-
WSN), network function virtualization (NFV) and cognitive
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radios (CRs) [4]. Hence, a widely accepted vision of IoT is
that any object can become a computing device that interacts
autonomously, in real-time, with its environment. With the
worldwide number of connected devices that are expected to
increase from nearly 27 billion connected devices in 2017 to
125 billion connected devices by 2030 [5], [6], that vision
will become a reality very soon. On the other hand, based on
an study from Business Fortune Insights (BFI) the global IoT
market, that valued at US$ 190 billion in 2018, is expected to
reach US$ 1,102.6 billion by 2026 [7].
Although the connectivity of devices increases signifi-
cantly, but advances in IoT architectures, protocols and adver-
sary models are still necessary to make the vision of the
IoT reality. Among all the technologies immersed in IoT,
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology is one of
the most prominent due to its maturity, low cost and strong
support from the industry [8].
RFID components include a tag (including a semicon-
ductor chip, an antenna and sometimes a battery), a reader
(including an antenna, an RF electronic module and a con-
trol module) and a back-end (database) server (for example,
a computer device that has a database and control software
runs on it). The exchange of information between the RFID
tag and the reader is done using radio waves. Reader’s con-
nection to the back-end (database) server is either permanent
through a secure channel or non-permanent through an unsafe
channel.
In RFID systems, to achieve one-end or mutual authenti-
cation, readers and tags may employ authentication protocols
(e.g. [9]–[13]). Despite recent advances in the domain of
RFID communication, the design of secure authentication
protocols has remained as a challenge yet [14], given the con-
straints of those devices, e.g. available power. For example,
several researches tried to provide desired security for RFID
system only using ultralightweigh operations, such as bit-
wise XOR, AND and rotation. However, later analysis have
shown that it may not be possible to design a secure protocol
without using sound cryptographic primetives [15], [16].
RFID authentication protocols can be divided into two
broad categories: (i) those with a permanent connection to
a back-end (database) server and (ii) those without a perma-
nent connection to a back-end (database) server (i.e. server-
less authentication protocols). Most of the existing RFID
authentication protocols belong in the first category (i.e. they
use a back-end server in their authentication process). In a
back-end server based authentication protocol, the reader
communicates with the back-end server to obtain all the data
linked to the target tag through a secure channel i.e. a reliable
and permanent connection between the RFID reader and the
back-end server. However, in some applications and scenarios
it may be impossible to provide a connection between the
RFID reader and the back-end server, e.g. any application
that may need a mobile RFID reader without or with very
limited connectivity. For instance, a ticket inspector at trains
is armed with an RFID reader which has a wireless connec-
tion with a back-end (database) server through a non-secure
channel. Another example is the telecare medicine where the
nurse should use a mobile reader and it is not reasonable to
assume that the reader has a permanent connection with the
server [17].
Therefore, to cover such scenarios, several server-less
authentication protocols have been proposed in the litera-
ture [18]–[24]. However, when two parties are communicat-
ing over a public channel then the adversary could affect the
transferred messages, for example to do aMan-in-the-Middle
Attack [25], this is the case for the server-reader communica-
tion also. In this direction, Wang and Ma [20] have analyzed
the security of a server-less mutual authentication protocol,
which has been proposed by Tan et al. [19], and showed that
this protocol is vulnerable to tracing attacks. Moreover, they
proposed two improved protocols, denoted by server-less
and server-mounted respectively, and claimed that the new
protocols are secure against all the common attacks on the
RFID context, i.e. eavesdropping, replay, impersonation and
DoS attacks. However, recently Gao et al. have shown that
the server-less protocol suffers from traceability attack [26].
In this article, we also show that the major security pitfalls
of server-mounted authentication protocol, we call it SMAP
(stands for server-mounted authentication protocol), which
has been proposed by Wang and Ma [20].
Our Contribution: Our main contributions are three-fold:
1) We analyze the security of a server-mounted mutual
authentication protocol which has been proposed by
Wang and Ma [20] and highlight its weaknesses. Our
security analysis clearly highlights critical security pit-
falls in this protocol. This work completes the recent
work of Gao et al. [26].
2) We introduce a novel security model which can be
employed in order to analyze the security of a protocol
for which the communication channel between a reader
and the back-end server is insecure. In this model,
we assume that an adversary A has already compro-
mised some tags. We investigate what is the impact of
this assumption on the security of the reader-to-server
communication channel and vice versa. In addition,
we scrutinize the security of the above mentioned pro-
tocol i.e. SMAP [20] using this model and show that in
this model the scheme is vulnerable.
3) Finally, we provide some countermeasures that can
be employed to overcome the exhibited flaws and
provide an improved protocol, called ISMAP (stands
for improved server-mounted authentication protocol),
which is secure under the new security model. In Addi-
tion, using supported GNY logic and the Scyther
tool, we formally evaluate the proposed protocol’s
security.
Organization: The paper is organized as following.
Section II describes the Wang and Ma authentication proto-
col [20]. In Section III, the security analysis of this protocol
is presented. Section IV introduces the new security model
and our analysis of the Wang and Ma authentication proto-
col [20] using this model. In Section V, we describe some
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FIGURE 1. SMAP: the server-mounted authentication protocol proposed by Wang and Ma.
countermeasures that can be employed to overcome the
described weaknesses. Finally, Section VI concludes the
paper.
II. WANG AND MA SERVER-MOUNTED MUTUAL
AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
Wang and Ma [20] have analyzed the security of the
server-less mutual authentication protocol proposed by Tan
et al. [19] and have shown that this protocol is vulnerable to
tracing attacks. To overcome these attacks,Wang andMa [20]
proposed two new protocols, a server-less protocol and a
server-mounted protocol. Recently Gao et al. have analysed
the server-less protocol in depth and the target of this paper
is the server-mounted protocol, which is called SMAP for the
sake of simplicity. Fig. 1 depicts this protocol, while Table 1
represents the notations that are used in the rest of the paper.
SMAP includes four entities:
- an RFID tag (Tj) with a unique identifier IDTj and a unique
secret key tj,
- an RFID reader (Ri) with unique identifier IDRi , - a
certification authority (CA),
- and a central database (CD) server with a unique identifier
IDCD.
Furthermore, both the RFID tag (Tj) and the RFID reader (Ri)
use a hash function h(·), which could be a lightweight hash
function such as PHOTON [27] or Quark [28]. Wang and
Ma [20] protocol can be divided into four phases: the setup
phase, the server-less authentication phase, the tag authenti-
cation phase and the tag searching phase.
A. SETUP PHASE
In this phase, each RFID reader (Ri) after being authenticated
to the Certification Authority (CA) receives: i) its unique
identifier IDRi , ii) a timestamp TS = h(TSP‖IDRi )
1 where
TSP is a time dependent value of the central database (CD)
which is updated periodically and, iii) an access listLi for the
tags T1, . . . , Tn such that:
Li =
{(
h(IDCD, t1)m, h(IDRi , t1), IDT1
)
, . . . ,(
h(IDCD, tn)m, h(IDRi , tn), IDTn
)}
,
where m denotes the number of bits defined by the certifi-
cation authority (CA) and ` is the output length of the hash
function h(·). It holds that m < `.
B. SERVER-LESS AUTHENTICATION PHASE
This phase is composed of three steps:
• Step 1: The RFID reader (Ri) sends its identifier IDRi
and a random number NRi to the RFID tag Tj.
• Step 2: The RFID tag (Tj) transmits to the RFID
reader (Ri) its random number NTj and the values a and
b such that:






• Step 3: The RFID reader (Ri) checks its access list
Li and compares the first part of each entry in the list
1TS which can be used as an identification value for the RFID readerRi.
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TABLE 1. Notations.
with the received value a listing all matched entries.






themwith the received value b. The case that no match is
found in, implies that either the requested tag Tj is fake
or that the RFID reader Ri is not authorized to read the
tag Tj.
C. SERVER-MOUNTED AUTHENTICATION PHASE
This phase can be divided into five following steps:
• Step 1: The RFID reader (Ri) has identified the
RFID tag (Tj) with identity IDTj . Then the RFID
reader (Ri) sends the tuple (NRi ,NTj , a, b, IDRi ,V )
where
V := h(TS‖NTj‖NRi ) to the central database (CD).
• Step 2:The central database (CD) receives the tuple sent
by the RFID reader (Ri) and verifies the correctness of
the received value V . In case the received value V is
not verified, the whole protocol aborts. If the value V is
verified then the central database (CD) using the access
list Li and the value a finds the tag’s (Tj) record and the
related IDTj . Then, the central database (CD) chooses a
random tag TCD from the access list Li (of the current
readerRi) with identifier IDTCD and secret tCD. CD also
chooses a random identifier IDK and a random nonce
NCD and calculates the below messages:






c := h(IDTj‖NCD‖IDRi )
d := h(TS‖IDK‖NCD)
e := h(IDTCD‖NRi‖NTj )⊕ IDK
Then, CD sends the tuple (a′, b′,NCD, c, d, e) back to
the RFID reader (Ri).
• Step 3: The RFID reader (Ri) verifies the correctness
of the received value c := h(IDTj‖NCD‖IDRi ). Then,Ri
finds the record of IDTCD in its memory, based on the
received information from CD. It extracts IDTCD , calcu-
lates IDK from the value of e := h(IDTCD‖NRi‖NTj ) ⊕
IDK and verifies the correctness of the received value
d := h(TS‖IDK‖NCD) to authenticate CD. Then the
RFID reader (Ri) sends NCD and IDK to the RFID tag
Tj.
• Step 4:TheRFID tag (Tj) generates a new randomnonce









• Step 5: The central database (CD) receives the above
mentioned tuple and verifies the correctness of the val-
ues h2(IDCD, tj)m and h
(
f (IDK , tj)‖NCD‖NTj,2
)
. If these
values are correct then the RFID reader (Ri) is authenti-
cated to access the RFID tag Tj and further information
is transferred.
D. TAG SEARCHING PHASE
The RFID tag searching scheme can be built by using the
server-less authentication scheme. The RFID reader starts
broadcasting its identifier IDRi and a random number NRi
to an RFID tag population. The RFID tags in the RFID
reader’s range will respond with NTj , a and b (i.e., a :=




⊕ IDRi ). The
RFID reader knows in advance the tag identifier IDTj and
the corresponding a of the target RFID tag. So, it filters all
the responses with a different a and with the desired answer,
it checks b and identifies the pursued RFID tag.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF SMAP
In this section, we analyze the security of the Wang and
Ma [20] server-mounted authentication protocol (SMAP) and
highlight its critical weaknesses. Before we describe the
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identified weaknesses, we should note here the classification
of information in the RFID communication according to
the Wang and Ma [20] protocol. More precisely, in [20]
information depending on the confidentiality level be fall into
following levels:
Level 1: In this level, the least confidential information are
included in RFID tags. More precisely, information such as
the RFID tags’ identifiers or other basic information such as
the destination of attached goods are stored on the RFID tags.
Level 2: In this level, more privileged information such as
the source of the tagged goods or the expected delivery date
are included in the RFID readers.
Level 3: In this level, more confidential information such
as the type of the tagged goods and their owner are stored
by the central database (CD) and they are accessible only to
the authenticated RFID readers. The central database (CD)
also keeps other lower-level information and the registration
information of the readers.
In the rest of this section, we describe in details the flaws
we have identified in the server-mounted authentication pro-
tocol (SMAP) proposed by Wang and Ma [20]. The first
weakness allows an active adversary (A) who has already
compromised an RFID tag Tj ∈ Li, to impersonate the central
database (CD) server and the RFID tag (Tj) to the RFID
reader (Ri). The second weakness allows an active adver-
sary (A), who has compromised some RFID tags, to imper-
sonate the RFID reader (Ri) to the central database (CD)
server and receive the level-3 information for the compro-
mised RFID tag from the central database server (CD).
A. CENTRAL DATABASE IMPERSONATION ATTACK
Following the given classification of information in the
SMAP, the central database (CD) server keeps both low-level
information and the most valuable information of the system.
Hence, impersonating the central database (CD) server can
have the most serious impact on the protocol functionality,
since an adversary (A) that successfully impersonates theCD
can transfer wrong information (i.e. information belonging in
level-3 according to the Wang and Ma classification). On the
other hand, to authenticate the CD, the following conditions
should hold:
1) The RFID reader (Ri) should verify the correctness of
the received value h(IDTj‖NCD‖IDRi ).
2) Ri should find the record of IDTCD in its memory, based
on the received information from the CD. In this way,
Ri may extract the identifier IDTCD .
3) Ri should calculate the identifier IDK from the value of
e := h(IDTCD‖NRi‖NTj ) ⊕ IDK and verifies the cor-
rectness of the received value d := h(TS‖IDK‖NCD)
to authenticate the CD.
Nevertheless, we present two scenarios that may be used by
an adversary A in order to impersonate the central database
(CD) server to the RFID reader (Ri). In the first scenario,
we show that an active adversary A which controls the com-
munication channel between the CD andRi can pass two out
of the above described conditions easily. Then, we present
another scenario, in which an active adversary A who has
compromised an RFID tag Tj belonging in the access list Li
can pass all three conditions.
In the first scenario, to pass the first two conditions,
the adversary (A) does as follows:
LEARNING PHASE: In this phase of the attack, the adver-
sary (A) eavesdrops one session of the authentication phase
of a protocol run between the RFID reader (Ri) (connected
to the RFID tag (Tj)) and the central database (CD) server
but blocks the last messages from the CD to the Ri. It also
stores h2(IDCD, tj)m, h(TS‖IDK‖NCD), h(IDTj‖NCD‖IDRi )
and NCD that are transferred from CD toRi over an insecure
wireless channel that is easily accessible by the adversaryA.
CD IMPERSONATION PHASE: In this phase of the attack,
in order to impersonate the target CD the adversary A does
as follows:
- Step 1: When the RFID reader (Ri) (connected to Tj)
sends the tuple (N ′Ri ,N
′
Tj , a, b, IDRi ,V ) where










V := h(TS‖NTj‖NRi )
to the CD server, the adversary (A) selects the following
values:










c := h(IDTj‖NCD‖IDRi )
d := h(TS‖IDK‖NCD)
e := h(IDTCD‖NRi‖NTj )⊕ IDK
and sends the tuple (a′, b′,NCD, c, d, e) back to the RFID
reader (Ri).
- Step 2: The RFID reader (Ri) verifies the correct-
ness of the received value d := h(IDTj‖NCD‖IDRi ). Then,
Ri finds the record of IDTj as TCD in its memory and
extracts IDTj as IDTCD , calculates IDK from the value of
e := h(IDTCD‖NRi‖NTj ) ⊕ IDK and verifies the cor-
rectness of the received value d := h(TS‖IDK‖NCD) to
authenticate CD.
Hence, following the given procedure, the adversary (A)
passes two of the required three conditions to be authenti-
cated as the legitimate central database (CD) server with the
success probability equal to 1. However, the adversary (A)
can pass the last condition with probability 1
2`
, where ` is
the output length of the hash function. Although the above
adversary has a negligible chance to pass the last condition,
the observation that two conditions can be easily bypassed
indicates a weak point in the design of Wang and Ma
protocol [20].
Now, we present another impersonation attack which is
based on the assumption that the adversary has already com-
promised a tag Tj ∈ Li. To impersonate the central database
VOLUME 8, 2020 125033
M. Hosseinzadeh et al.: New Strong Adversary Model for RFID Authentication Protocols
(CD) server in this scenario, the adversary (A) does as
follows:
LEARNING PHASE:
- Step 1:Assume thatA has already compromised anRFID
tag Tj ∈ Li to retrieve IDTj , h2(IDCD, tj)m and h(IDRi , ti),
where h2(IDCD, ti)m can also be retrieved without compro-
mising the RFID tag.
- Step 2: A eavesdrops one session of the authenti-
cation phase of protocol between Ri (connected to Tj)
and CD but blocks the last messages from Ri to Tj.
It also stores h2(IDCD, tj)m, h(TS‖IDK‖NCD),NCD, IDK and
h(IDTj‖NCD‖IDRi ) that are transferred from CD to Ri over
an insecure wireless channel that is easily accessible by the
adversary.
CD IMPERSONATION PHASE: In this phase of the attack,
to impersonate the target CD the adversary (A) performs the
following steps:
- Step 1: When Ri (connected to Tj) sends the












IDTj , IDRi , h(TS‖NTj‖NRi )) to the central database (CD) the
adversary (A) selects/calculates the following values:

















and sends the tuple (a′, b′,NCD, c, d, e) back to the RFID
reader (Ri).
- Step 2: The RFID reader (Ri) verifies the correctness of
the received value c := h(IDTj‖NCD‖IDRi ), which is correct.
Then, Ri finds the record of IDTj as TCD in its memory and





Tj )⊕ IDK and verifies the correctness of the
received value d := h(TS‖IDK‖NCD) to authenticate theCD,
which is also correct.
Hence, following the given attack, an active adversary (A)
who has compromised an RFID tag Tj ∈ Li can impersonate
theCD efficiently. The success probability of the given attack
is 1 while the attack complexity is compromising an RFID tag
Tj and just two runs of the protocol.
B. READER IMPERSONATION ATTACK
As it mentioned already, in SMAP, RFID tags keep lower-
level information while the central database (CD) keeps both
lower-level information and the most valuable information
of the system. Hence, if an adversary (A) compromises an
RFID tag, it can only receive lower-level information related
to the RFID tag holder. However, if it can impersonate an
RFID reader (Ri) to the central database (CD) server (an
RFID reader which has access to that RFID tag) then the
adversary (A) can retrieve all the information related to the
RFID tag holder from the CD. Hence, it is very crucial for
the protocol to withstand both RFID reader Ri and central
database (CD) server impersonation attacks.
Nevertheless, we show that an adversary (A) may imper-
sonate an RFID reader (Ri) to the central database (CD)
server. To impersonate the RFID reader (Ri), the adver-
sary (A) does as follows:
LEARNING PHASE:
- Step 1: Assume that the adversary (A) has already
compromised M tags (T1, . . . , TM ) ∈ Li to retrieve
{(IDTj , IDCD, tj)}, for 1 ≤ j ≤ M , and aims to retrieve the
higher-level information related to a compromised RFID tag.




h(IDCD, t1)m, h(IDRi , t1), IDT1
)
, . . . ,(
h(IDCD, tM )m, h(IDRM , tM ), IDTM
)}
- Step 2: A eavesdrops one session of the authentication
phase of protocol between Ri (connected to any Tj) and CD
and stores (IDRiNRi ,NTj , h(TS‖NTj‖NRi )) that are trans-
ferred from Ri to CD over an insecure wireless channel and
easily accessible by the adversary.
RFID READER Ri IMPERSONATION PHASE:
In this phase of the attack, to impersonate the RFID
reader (Ri) and retrieve higher-level information of Tj, for
1 ≤ j ≤ M , the adversary (A) does as follows:





⊕ IDTj , IDRi , h(TS‖NTj‖NRi )) to
CD.
- Step 2: The central database (CD) receives the tuple
sent by the adversary (A) and verifies the correctness of
the received value V . The value V is verified and CD finds
Tj ∈ Li and chooses a random tag TCD from the access list Li
(of the reader Ri) with identifier IDTCD and secret tCD. The
CD server also chooses a random identifier IDK and a random
nonceNCD. Then, the central database (CD) server calculates
the messages:






c := h(IDTi‖NCD‖IDRi )
d := h(TS‖IDK‖NCD)
e := h(IDTCD‖NRi‖NTj )⊕ IDK
and sends the tuple (a′, b′,NCD, c, d, e) back to the RFID
reader (Ri) which is the adversary.
- Step 3: A selects a tag T ′CD ∈ L′i based on the received
h2(IDCD, tCD)m, if there is any match, and calculates ID
′
K
as ID′K := e ⊕ h(IDT ′CD‖NRi‖NTj ). The adversary (A) then
selects a random NTj,2 and sends the following tuple to the
central database (CD) server:{
NTj,2 , h
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- Step 5: The central database (CD) server receives the
above mentioned tuple and verifies the correctness of the val-
ues h2(IDCD, tj)m and h
(
f (IDK , tj)‖NCD‖NTj,2
)
(the former
condition is confirmed with probability equal to 1). If these
values are correct thenA is authenticated as the RFID reader
Ri to access the RFID tag (Tj) and further information is
transferred.
In the above attack, the adversary (A) succeeds in the
attack if the central database (CD) server selects TCD ∈ L′i
and the adversary (A) makes a correct decision among the
RFID tags in L′i with the similar record of h2(IDCD, tCD)m.
Assuming that the adversary (A) has compromised M tags
then, on average, each M2m tags have a same record of
h2(IDCD, tCD)m. In addition, the central database (CD) server
selects an RFID tag TCD ∈ L′i with the probability of Mn ,
where n is number of RFID tags in Li. Hence the success
probability (PImpRM ,1 ) of the given adversary (A) to imperson-








where, after q rounds of the described attack, the success
probability (PImpRM ,q ) of the given adversary (A) to imperson-
ate the RFID reader (Ri) is determined as follows:













The success probability for q × M ≈ n is expected to be
non-negligible. For example, if M2m ≤ 1 and q×M ≈ n then
PImpRM ,q = 1− e
−1.
IV. THE NEW STRONG ADVERSARY MODEL
In this section, we introduce a novel comprehensive adversary
model which may be employed for the security analysis of
any protocol for which the communication channel between
the RFID reader Ri and the central database (CD) server is
assumed to be insecure. In addition, we analyze the security
of SMAP in this model.
A. RELATED ADVERSARY MODELS
Adversary who plays a main role in cryptanalysis of
RFID security protocols can briefly categorized to three
groups [29]: Passive adversary who can eavesdrop, intercept
and replay protocols messages which are transferred over
insecure channels. For example, in eavesdropping, it is not
necessary to power RFID tag itself, so it can occur from large
distance in comparison impersonating attacks [30]. Active
adversary who can impersonate one of the protocols parties
(i.e., tag, reader or back-end database ) by using suitable
devices (i.e. a rough reader for reader impersonation in the
close proximity of a legitimate tag) and then communicate
with the other protocol’s party and in this line she can modify
the transferred protocols messages. Putting impersonating
devices in the close proximity of readers or tags is the main
complexity of such attacks [30]. Moreover, modifying or
blocking transferred messages can accomplished by using
man in the middle devices [31].
Strong active adversary who has this ability to retrieve the
tag and find out its identifier by producers same as physical
reverse engineering and side channel attacks [29].
In this paper, the active adversary model is used in the first
scenario of attack for central database impersonation attack
and strong adversary model is used for reader impersonation
attack and also second scenario of attack for central database
impersonation attack.
In [32], the eight most well-known RFID privacy models
are examined and compared. In these models, it is considered
that the adversary is able to interact/play with an RFID tag
in its neighborhood. These mentioned iterations are mod-
eled by oracles. Among the generic oracles, CORRUPT (T )
returns the secret values of an RFID tag. All these models
focus on the reader-tag channel, but the server-reader (or
server-adversary) channel is not considered. As mentioned in
Section I, there are many scenarios where we cannot assume a
secure channel between the reader and the server. Moreover,
a portion of the whole tag population can be compromised.
This fact is what is studied in the proposed adversary model
and it may easily be combined with the existing privacy
models.
B. ADVERSARY MODEL
In this adversary model, we assume that the adversary (A)
has compromised some RFID tags for which the RFID
reader (Ri) has a record. Then, it should not increase
the adversary’s advantage for impersonating the RFID
reader (Ri) to the central database (CD) server or vice versa.
We formally define the adversary’s (A) advantage to imper-
sonate the RFID reader (Ri) to the central database (CD)
sever or vice versa as follows:
Definition 1: An authentication protocol for which the
communication channel between the RFID reader (Ri) and
the central database (CD) server is insecure, it is said to
be (tA,M/n, q, ε) compromised-tag-reader secure if for any
polynomial-time (PPT) adversaryA, which has compromised
at most M RFID tags of the whole population with n RFID
tags A(T1...TM ), for its advantage to impersonate the RFID
reader (Ri) to the CD server (it outputs 1 if it does the attack




∣∣∣P [A(T1...TM ) ⇒ 1]− P [A⇒ 1]∣∣∣ ≤ ε
where A(T1...TM ) / A consumes at most polynomial time tA
and has access to at most q sessions of the protocol. The
protocol is said to be (computationally) compromised-tag-
reader security if the bound ε is a negligible function of
the security parameter k , where k represents the total length
of the secret parameters in the protocol. It must be noted
that in this definition, A denotes an adversary which has not
compromised any tag.
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Definition 2: An authentication protocol for which the
communication channel between the RFID reader (Ri) and
the central database (CD) server is insecure, is said to be
(tA,M/n, q, ε) compromised-tag-server secure if for any
PPT adversary A, which has compromised at most M RFID
tags out of the whole population of n RFID tags A(T1...TM ),
for its advantage to impersonate the CD server to the RFID




∣∣∣P [A(T1...TM ) ⇒ 1]− P [A⇒ 1]∣∣∣ ≤ ε
where A(T1...TM ) / A consumes at most polynomial time tA
and has access to at most q sessions of the protocol. The
protocol is said to be (computationally) compromised-tag-
server secure if the bound ε is a negligible function of the
security parameter k , where k represents the total length of
the secret parameters in the protocol.
Following the impersonation attack described in
Section III-A, the adversary (A)’s advantage to impersonate
the CD server to the RFID reader (Ri), when it has compro-
mised an RFID tag, is ‘‘1’’. Hence, SMAP is (tA, 1/n, 1, 1)
compromised-tag-server secure where, tA is a constant time
to send the requested messages. In this attack, the hash
function used in SMAP can be any hash function and we
consider it as a random oracle.
To evaluate the SMAP security under the given adversary
model and the random oracle model for the used hash func-
tion, against RFID reader impersonation attack we recall the
attack which is presented in Section III-B. Following that
attack, the adversary (A)’s advantage to impersonateRi after
q runs of the protocol, when it has compromised M RFID









. Hence, SMAP is (tA,M/n, q,P
ImpR
M ,q )
compromised-tag-server secure where, tA is a constant time
to calculate and send the requested messages.
The above analysis shows that SMAP is not a secure proto-
col under the given adversary model at all. The given adver-
sary model is important because the valuable information is
stored in the reader and the central database. Hence, by imper-
sonating the reader, an adversary can reveal information from
CD related to the compromised RFID tag which is not stored
on the RFID tag’s memory. On the other hand, by imperson-
ating the CD server, the adversary (A) can deceive the RFID
reader (Ri), e.g., forcing the RFID reader (Ri) to send the
tagged object to a wrong owner.
V. IMPROVEMENT OF SMAP
The first obvious weakness of SMAP is the way the central
database (CD) uses to calculate its answer to the reader,
i.e., (a′, b′,NCD, c, d, e). In particular, it uses the information
related to another tag when the target tag is being authen-
ticated. This is a pitfall that unnecessarily discloses infor-
mation related to a tag, which is not involved in the current
session of the protocol. The second weakness resides in the
fact that the adversary can use the messages sent by the reader
and also the messages transferred in old sessions to satisfy
parts of the expected answers from CD to Ri. To overcome
the above mentioned weaknesses, we embed a counter on
each reader, denoted by CRi and initiated it by zero, and also
keep a copy of it in CD (see Fig. 2). Moreover, we revise
the exchanged messages between the involved entities in the
server-mounted authentication phase of SMAP. Specifically,
the revised scheme can be divided into the following steps:
• Step 1: The RFID reader (Ri) has identified the RFID
tag (Tj) with identity IDTj . Then the RFID reader (Ri)
sends the tuple (NRi ,NTj , a, b, IDRi ,V , CRi ) to the
central database (CD) and updates CRi by CRi + 1,
where:






V := h(TS‖NTj‖NRi‖CRi )
• Step 2: The central database (CD) receives the tuple
sent by the RFID reader (Ri) and verifies the cor-
rectness of the received value V and checks whether
(CRi )new > (CRi )old , where (CRi )new is the sent value
by the reader and (CRi )old is the record of CRi in CD.
In case the received value V is not verified or (CRi )old ≥
(CRi )new, the whole protocol aborts; otherwise, the cen-
tral database (CD) using the access list Li and the value
a finds the tag’s (Tj) record and the related IDTj . Then,
the central database (CD) generates a nonce NCD and
calculates the following messages:
c := h(TS‖IDTj‖NRi‖CRi )⊕ NCD
d := h(IDTj‖TS‖NTj‖NCD‖NRi‖CRi )
Then, CD updates CRi by (CRi )new and sends the tuple
(c, d) back to the RFID reader (Ri).
• Step 3: The RFID reader (Ri) extracts NCD from the
received value c := h(TS‖IDTj‖NRi‖CRi ) ⊕ NCD and
verifies the correctness of the received value d :=
h(TS‖IDTj‖NTj‖NCD‖NRi‖CRi ) to authenticate CD.
Then the RFID reader (Ri) sends NCD and IDRi to the
RFID tag Tj.
• Step 4:TheRFID tag (Tj) generates a new randomnonce










• Step 5: The central database (CD) receives the
above mentioned tuple and verifies the correctness
of the values a′ := h2(IDCD, tj)m and b′ :=
h
(
f (IDRi , tj)‖NCD‖NTj,2
)
. If these values are correct
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FIGURE 2. ISMAP: the improved version of SMAP.
then the RFID reader (Ri) is authenticated to access the
RFID tag Tj and further information is transferred.
A. ON THE SECURITY OF THE ISMAP
In the improved protocol, i.e. ISMAP, any exchanged




which remains identical as in the original
SMAP and is shared between several tags. In addition,
the authentication process of Tj does not reveal any informa-
tion linked to Ti, for any Ti 6= Tj. Moreover, the exchanged
messages are selected such that any adversary has negligible
advantage to reuse effectively a message transferred in the
current session on a later session. The embedded counter CRi
prevents the use of eavesdropped messages on later sessions.
Hence the modified protocol provides a higher security level
and overcomes the pitfalls of its predecessor. More precisely,
our reasoning against common attacks is as follows:
1) TRACEABILITY
Although the structure of the message a = h2(IDCD, tj)m
can be used to trace a group of tags, which is inherit from
the original SMAP, the remaining messages are randomized
by nonces and computed by an one way hash function such,
which could be a lightweight hash function such as PHO-
TON [27] or Quark [28].Therefore it is not feasible for any
adversary to link messages eavesdropped on the channel to
a particular tag – or tag’s holder. It should be noted such
information has already been used to trace a tag, e.g. [26],
[33]–[35] to trace the tag in a search protocol or [26] to
trace the tag in the server-less version of Wang and Ma
protocol. The main idea behind such a traceability is to send
several queries and then determine whether the given tag is
the target tag or not. However, it worth noting, in both SMAP
and ISMAP, a = h2(IDCD, tj)m is used to reduce the server
load and provide a scalable protocol. By reducingm, tracing a
target tag gets harder but the reader/server task to identify the
target tag uniquely will also increases. In this case, there is
a trade off between the protocol efficiency and tag’s privacy.
For example, one can set m = 0, which means that the tag
does not send a = h2(IDCD, tj)m, then the adversary will
not be able to trace the tag in this way. However, to identify
the tag, the reader/server should do an exhaustive search over





⊕IDTj . It should be noted, in the
revised protocol by Gao et al. [26], to reduce the reader/server
cost they use a dynamic group index denoted by gi and tag
transfers h(gi). Although it is dynamic and can provide a
better security against traceability attack, however, it could
be used to distinguish tags from different groups, as far as
they have not updated their group index.
In both SMAP and its improved version, ISMAP, the reader
sends its identification value IDRi over an insecure chan-
nel which can be used to trace the reader. Nevertheless,
the privacy location of the reader was not one of the security
requirements when the scheme was designed.
2) TAG IMPERSONATION
to impersonate a legitimate tag, an adversary should





⊕ IDTj . While it is possible for the
adversary to create a valid a, however, it has a negligi-
ble chance to generate a valid b without the knowledge of
h(IDRi , tj) and IDTj , given that NRi is contributed by the
reader and is out of the adversary’s control. Furthermore, if Tj
is compromised, it does not help the adversary to impersonate
Ti 6= Tj, because the private information of Tj does not reveal
any information related to Ti.
3) READER IMPERSONATION
to impersonate a legitimate reader to CD, an adversary
should recover the contributed nonce by CD, i.e., NCD,
from c = h(TS‖IDTj‖NRi‖CRi ) ⊕ NCD and send it to Tj.
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TABLE 2. Security comparison of SMAP and ISMAP, where A1, A2, A3, A4,
A5 and A6 respectively denote security against tag impersonation attack,
reader impersonation attack, CD impersonation attack, traceability attack,
desynchronization attack and the new adversary model.
However, to recover that nonce, the adversary needs TS
and IDTj that are private values. In addition, the reader
cannot just replay the eavesdropped messages from an old
session in a later one, due to the increasing counter CRi .
On the other hand, compromising Tj or any number of
tags, does not help the adversary to impersonate the reader
and receive high level information related to the compro-
mised tag or other tags from the CD. The reason is the fact
that to complete the authentication process an adversary at
least needs the knowledge of TS, which is not extractable
from any compromised tag or exchanged messages over
channel.
4) SERVER IMPERSONATION
to impersonate a legitimate server toRi, an adversary should
generate a valid pair of c = h(TS‖IDTj‖NRi‖CRi ) ⊕ NCD
and d = h(IDTj‖TS‖NTj‖NCD‖NRi‖CRi ) where NRi is
contributed by the reader and TS is a secret parameter only
known by the legitimate reader and CD. Therefore any adver-
sary has a negligible advantage to impersonate CD.
5) NEW ADVERSARY MODEL
In ISMAP, compromising Tj or any number of tags, does
not help the adversary to impersonate the server to the
reader. This is due to the fact that to impersonate the server,
the adversary at least needs the knowledge of TS which
is not extractable from any compromised tag or transferred
messages over channel.
6) DE-SYNCHRONIZATION ATTACK
The only parameter which is updated and could lead to
desynchronize the reader from CD is CRi . However, to do
so, the adversary either should impersonate the reader which
is not feasible or block many queries from reader to CD such
that the counter overflows and restarts from zero which is also
impractical assuming that the length of the counter is enough
large (e.g., 64 bits).
7) SECURITY COMPARISON
In Table 2, the security of ISMAP is compared with SMAP
against different attacks, which shows that ISMAP provides
better security against different attacks.
B. FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS OF ISMAP
So far, several formal methods have been developed to evalu-
ate the robustness of a cryptographic protocol. Formal meth-
ods are either manual such as GNY logic [36], SVO [37],
and BAN logic [38] or automatic such as AVISPA [39],
Proverif [40], CryptoVerif [41] and Scyther [42]. In this
section, we evaluate the security of ISMAP using GNY logic
and the Scyther tool, which are widely accepted methods to
formally evaluate the security of a cryptographic protocol and
have been used to evaluate the security of many protocols so
far, e.g. [43]–[48].
1) GNY LOGIC PROOF
To evaluate the security of a protocol using GNY logic,
an analyzer should follow several steps, that are as follows:
• The messages of the protocol are expressed in the GNY
logic form.
• The messages of the protocol will be idealized, where
the messages that are plain or do not increase the confi-
dentiality are deleted.
• Proper security assumptions and security goals of the
protocol are expressed.
• Finally, based on the GNY logic rules, the security goals
are deduced from idealized messages and also the pro-
tocol assumptions.
Here, based on the notations that are represented in Table 3,
the robustness of ISMAP is deduced using GNY logic, as
follows:
• The messages of ISMAP are written using GNY logic
notations. Table 4 represents the ISMAP messages in
GNY logic format.
• In this step, which is the idealization step of the proof,
plain messages of ISMAP are deleted. Table 5 shows the
output of this step for ISMAP.
• In this step, the ISMAP’s assumptions and security goals
are expressed. Table 6 shows the output of this step for
ISMAP.
• Ultimately, using messages and protocol assumptions
and based on the GNY logic rules, we deduce the desired
security goals. Table 7 represents the output of this step
for ISMAP protocol.
Based on Table 7, given, A13 and F1, we can deduce that
D1 : CD| ≡ ]{NTj ,NRi ,CRi}. Using A15, based on R1,
we retrieve thatD2 : CD| ≡ φ({NTj ,NRi ,CRi}). Using IM3,
A32, A23, D2, D1 and based on I1, we deduce that D3 :
CD| ≡ Ri| ∼ {NTj ,NRi ,CRi}. Considering D3 and based
on I7, we retrieve that D4 : CD| ≡ Ri| ∼ NRi . Since I1
has three outputs, using IM3, A32, A23,D2,D1 and based on
I1, we also deduce that D5 : CD| ≡ Ri 3 {NTj ,NRi ,CRi}.
Considering D5 based on P3 results D6 : CD| ≡ Ri 3 NTj .
Given, A7, based on F1, we deduce that D7 :
Ri| ≡ ]{IDTj ,NTj ,NCD,NRi ,CRi}. Using A9, based on R1,
we retrieve that D8 : Ri| ≡ φ({IDTj ,NTj ,NCD,NRi ,CRi}).
Using IM4,A31, A22, D8, D7 and based on I1, we deduce
that D9 : Ri| ≡ CD| ∼ {IDTj ,NTj ,NCD,NRi ,CRi}.
Considering D9 and based on I7, we retrieve that D10 :
Ri| ≡ CD| ∼ NCD. Since I1 has three outputs, using
IM4, A31, A22, D8, D7 and based on I1, we also deduce
that D11 : Ri| ≡ CD 3 {IDTj ,NTj ,NCD,NRi ,CRi}.
Considering D11 based on P3 results D12 : Ri| ≡
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TABLE 3. GNY logic notations and rules that are used in this paper.
TABLE 4. GNY logic expression of ISMAP messages.
TABLE 5. ISMAP messages idealization.
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FIGURE 3. Reprenstiation of ISMAP in the SPDL.
CD 3 NTj . Given D11 based on P3 also results
D13 : Ri| ≡ CD 3 NRi .
Given, A10, based on F1, we deduce that D14 :
CD| ≡ ]{IDRi ,NCD,NTj,2 , IDTj}. Using A12, based on R1,
we retrieve that D15 : CD| ≡ φ({IDRi ,NCD,NTj,2 , IDTj}).
Using IM7, A27, A17, D15, D14 and based on I1, we deduce
that D16 : CD| ≡ Tj| ∼ {IDRi ,NCD,NTj,2 , IDTj}. Consid-
ering D16 and based on I7, we retrieve that D17 : CD| ≡
Tj| ∼ NTj,2 . Since I1 has three outputs, using IM7,A27, A17,
D15,D14 and based on I1, we also deduce thatD18 : CD| ≡
Tj 3 {IDRi ,NCD,NTj,2 , IDTj}. Considering D18 based on P3
results D19 : CD| ≡ Tj 3 NCD.
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FIGURE 4. The results of security verification of ISMAP in the Scyther tool.
G1 indicates that the random number, i.e. NRi which is
sent by Ri, is not changed through insecure channel and is
received unchanged by CD.
G2 shows that CD believesRi possesses NTj which means
CD believes Ri can compute and verify any formula includ-
ing NTj .
G3 indicates that the random number NCD, which is sent
by CD, has not been changed through insecure channel and it
is received unchanged by Ri and Ri believes that what it has
received as NCD is the same NCD which has been sent by CD.
G4 shows thatRi believes CD possesses NTj which means
Ri believes that CD can compute and verify any formula
including NTj .
G5 shows thatRi believesCD possessesNRi which means
Ri believes that CD can compute and verify any formula
including NRi .
G6 indicates that the random numberNTj,2 , which is sent by
Tj, is not changed through insecure channel and it is received
unchanged by CD and CD believes that what it has received
as NTj,2 is the same NTj,2 which has been sent by Tj.
G7 shows that CD believes Tj possesses NCD which
means CD believes Tj can compute and verify any formula
including NCD.
Following the above argument, we can conclude that, based
on the GNY logic, ISMAP provides desired security against
various attacks.
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TABLE 6. ISMAP assumption and security goals.
TABLE 7. ISMAP security goals deduction.
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2) THE SCYTHER TOOL PROOF
In this section, we evaluate the security of ISMAP using the
Scyther tool. It is an automatic tool for checking the security
or insecurity of protocols which is written in Python lan-
guage. To evaluate the security of protocol using the Scyther
tool, the following steps should be performed:
• expressing the desired protocol in the Security Protocol
Description Language (SPDL);
• expressing security claims in the protocol specifications;
• performing the necessary settings, such as maximum
number of runs, determining search pruning and max-
imum number of patterns per claim in the Scyther tool’s
settings;
• running the code of protocol and getting the result. If the
Scyther tool can not find the attack, it evaluates the
security feature OK, and if it succeeds in finding the
attack, it fails that feature and shows the flowchart of
the attack scenario.
For security analysis, ISMAPwas described in the Security
Protocol Description Language (SPDL) as it is described in
Figure 3. Figure 4 depicts the results of security verification
of ISMAP in the Scyther tool, which confirms the security of
ISMAP.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we analyzed the security of a mutual authen-
tication protocol proposed by Wang and Ma. Our security
analysis shows critical security flaws in this scheme, which
were missed by the protocol designers and previous studies
also. By exploiting these pitfalls, an active adversary (A)
who has already compromised some RFID tags may suc-
cessfully impersonate an RFID reader (Ri) or the central
database (CD) or server. Finally, we introduced an adver-
sary model that takes into account that the communication
channel between an RFID reader and the database server is
insecure. Furthermore, we introduced an improved server-
mounted protocol, called ISMAP and showed that ISMAP
provides desired security against various attacks, include the
new attack that has been introduced in this paper.
However, in this paper we have not considered multi-
server or multi-reader environments [49], [50]. Given that,
in ISMAP, we have embedded a counter on the reader and
the counter value is updated, it could be a source of desyn-
chronization attack in such environments. Hence, assuming
any tag can communicate with any reader/server, designing
a secure protocol for multi-server/reader environments is an
interesting challenge which we leave it as future work.
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